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A BRIEF LOOK AT RECRIMINATION
MYRON M. MILLER*
*Student, University of Denver College of Law

The equitable rule that one who invokes the aid of the court
must come into it with a clear conscience and with clean hands
has been applied by the courts in divorce proceedings and has
formed the basis for the doctrine of recrimination. It is now well
established in this country under this doctrine, that the defendant
to an action of divorce may set up as a defense in bar that the
plaintiff was guilty of misconduct which in itself is a ground for
divorce. It is not necessary that the plaintiff's misconduct be the
same or of the same degree as that alleged misconduct of the
defendant's; but by the weight of authority, when divorce statutes
specify certain acts of misconduct which will provide grounds for
absolute divorce, any one is good as a bar-a recriminatory defense-regardless of a moral point of view. The misconduct must
have been committed by the plaintiff knowingly and without connivance, justification, or excuse. Therefore, knowing that he who
seeks redress for a violation of a contract based on mutual and
dependent covenants must himself have performed the obligation
on his part, what has been the progress and application of this
principle in Colorado?
RECRIMINATION IN COLORADO

The statutory law is set out in the 1935

COLO. STAT. ANN., C.
56, §7, entitled "Cross-complaint-Both parties guilty-Divorce
denied-" as follows:

In any action for divorce the defendant may file a
cross-complaint in which may be set forth any one or
more causes for divorce or separate maintenance against
the plaintiff; and if upon the trial of such action both
parties shall be found guilty of any one or more of the
causes of divorce, then divorce shall not be granted to
either of said parties.
The statute has not been amended, and this is the statutory law
in Colorado today, as far as recrimination is concerned. The statute specifically says that the parties may be found guilty of "any"
ground for divorce, and Colorado has followed this line of application from as far back as 1892 as evidenced by the case of Reddington v. Reddington.1
In that case the defendant was guilty of desertion and nonsupport, and the. plaintiff guilty of adultery; it was held that both
the complaint and the cross-complaint should have been dismissed.
The court in its opinion stated, "In estimation of law, all grounds
of divorce are of equal force and validity, notwithstanding supposed differences in point of morals, and in the gravity of the
12 Colo. App. 8, 29 P. 811 (1892).
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offenses involved." From this opinion we can conclude that Colorado is in accord with the weight of authority as mentioned ante,
in that the offenses of the plaintiff and the defendant need not be
the same.
Courts May Sua Sponte Declare Recriminationand Deny Divorce
A first suggestion of the court's power to deny divorce on
the grounds of recrimination when the defendant has not set up
the plaintiff's misconduct as either a bar or a cross-complaint,
appeared in the opinion of the case of Ward v. Ward.2 Here the
court said where the trial develops facts which would make the
granting of a divorce inequitable or unjust, the court has a duty
to see to it that a decree of divorce is denied. This inference became the rule rather than remaining a suggestion in the case of
Garver v. Garver.3 The court stated as follows: "If upon the
testimony presented, the wife applying for the divorce appears
to have been herself guilty of willful desertion, it is the duty of
the court, upon its own motion to deny her application." Because
of this case, the rule seems to be settled that in Colorado the court
can deny divorce and claim recrimination on its motion.
Effect of Recrimination on Alimony
In the case of Cupples v. Cupples,4 the wife sued for separate
maintenance. The husband-defendant set up a recriminatory defense, but did not seek a divorce. The court held that (1) the
defendant could set up a recriminatory defense and did not have
to seek a divorce and (2) the fact that the defendant had established facts which would entitle him to a divorce was not sufficient
reason for the disallowance of alimony. However, the case of
Elliott v. Elliott,5 decided shortly after the Cupples case, supra,
and in effect seems to change the Cupples ruling, states the apparent prevailing rule in Colorado as follows: "If by reason of misconduct of both parties neither was entitled to a divorce, and the
complaint was dismissed as to the divorce, it is error for the court
to decree alimony and separate maintenance to the plaintiff, the
action should have been dismissed." The Elliott case leaves the
writer with the impression that Colorado extends the "clean hands"
doctrine to alimony, and before a party can seek alimony the party
desiring the court's aid must come into the court with clean hands.
Another sidelight may be noted here from a 1916 Colorado
case 6 which points out that failure by a defendant to a divorce
action to comply with an order granting the plaintiff temporary
alimony and suit money is not sufficient ground to prevent the
defendant from making his defense of recrimination, or any defense he has, as it would then be depriving the defendant of his
225 Colo. 33, 52 P. 1105 (1898).

'52 Colo. 227, 121 P. 165 (1912).
431 Colo. 443, 72 P. 1056 (1903).
534 Colo. 298, 83 P. 630 (1905).
6Frey v. Frey, 61 Colo. 581, 158 P. 714 (1916).
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constitutional right to be heard before being deprived of his
property or personal rights.
Miscellaneous Notes As to Recrimination
The case of Sholes v. Sholes I states that where a wife sues
for divorce on grounds of mental cruelty and is denied divorce
because of recrimination, she is also denied separate maintenance
in a subsequent action using the same acts of cruelty during the
same period of time, since it has been judicially determined that
the charge of cruelty was not sustained, there was left no basis
for a suit of separate maintenance.
The case of Harms v. Harms 8 points out that where a divorce
action is brought by a resident of the state of the forum against
a non-resident, a divorce may be granted the non-resident upon
his or her cross petition, in spite of the fact that the statute requires the plaintiff in an action for divorce to have been a resident for a specified time. The defendant, in such a case, need not
plead statutory residence and is not limited by the statute concerning acts of cruelty committed within the state of Colorado,
but would be free to establish cruelty committed subsequent to
the marriage no matter where committed.
It should also be noted that condoned adultery is not a bar
to a divorce, because it is not a ground for divorceY
RECRIMINATION AND ITS APPLICATION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Thirty-two jurisdictions have recrimination statutes. Of these
32 jurisdictions, 29 provide for recrimination as an absolute defense, while 3 give the court the power to use its discretion for
the final determination of the effect of the complainant's misconduct.
Doctrine of Comparative Rectitude
The doctrine of comparative rectitude has been defined as
the principle that, under proper circumstances, relief by way of
divorce may be given to the party least at fault, although both
parties have shown ground for divorce. 10 The courts adopting
this doctrine seem to apply it in cases where it appears that the
parties cannot possibly live together again, the idea being that
it is not only for the parties' welfare but for the general welfare
of society as well. It has also been suggested that the mere fact
that both parties are at fault and desirous of a divorce, is sufficient reason for granting divorce.
The Ohio court I" in repudiating comparative rectitude stated,
"A court cannot find both parties guilty of acts of misconduct
constituting a ground for divorce and then grant a divorce to the
party the less guilty of the two. One party must be guilty and
the other innocent of acts constituting a ground for divorce, before
72 Colo. 175, 209 P. 1046 (1922).
'120 Colo. 212, 209 P. 2d 522 (1949).
'Jones v. Jones, 71 Colo. 420, 207 P. 596 (1922).
10159 A.L.R. 734.
,1Veler v. Veler, 57 Ohio 155, 12 N.E. 2d 783.
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a court can enter a decree." While the Michigan court 12 stated,
"The scales of equity cannot be adjusted to measure degrees of
culpability between erring spouses."
Same Offense Doctrine
Those following this doctrine advocate that no divorce may
be decreed to the complainant if he is guilty of the same offense
charged against the defendant. This doctrine departs from the
general rule that a recriminatory offense need not be of the same
nature as the offense of which the defendant is guilty, and states
that the defendant can only set up as a recriminatory defense the
same offense the plaintiff has charged him with. This doctrine is
expressly followed by the Texas courts 13 in their holdings that
the misconduct of the plaintiff, in order to constitute a defense
to the suit, must, even if sufficient to give the defendant cause for
divorce upon the assumption of his entire innocence, be of the
same general character and degree as the misconduct of the defendant relied on by the plaintiff as ground of suit, and must have
been provocatory of the defendant's acts of misconduct.
By use of this doctrine, the doctrine of recrimination is
greatly cut down as to its extensive application, and the complainant also has a much greater chance of obtaining a divorce.
In effect, the same offense doctrine is an extension of the doctrine
of comparative rectitude, and they both enjoy little popularity.
Statutes Allowing the Court to Use Its Discretion
Some states have seen the ills of recrimination in that the
court forces the erring spouses to continue the marriage contractit leaves the parties where it found them, when they both have
dirty hands-and these states have passed statutes which grant
to the trial court the authority to exercise its discretion as to the
granting or denying of a divorce when the parties appear to be
in equal wrong. Such jurisdictions as Kansas, 14 Minnesota, 15 Oklahoma,1 6 and Wyoming 17 have deemed it proper to give their courts
such discretionary powers.
Types of Statutes 18
There are 8 types of statutes in the 32 jurisdictions following
recrimination which are as follows: (where the defendant is
guilty of . .
the defendant can recriminate by showing the
plaintiff guilty of . . ).
Adultery-adultery (15); any cause-any cause (6); any
12Vardon v. Vardon, 266 Mich. 341, 253 N.W. 320.
"a
Hale v. Hale, 26 Am. Rep. 294: Trigg v. Trigg, 18 S. W. 313.
' Larsen v. Larsen, 134 Kans. 436, 7 P. 2d 120; Roberts v. Roberts, 103 Kans.
65, 173 P. 536.
Vanderhuff v. Vanderhuff, 144 F. 2d 509, 79 App. D. C. 153.
"Panther v. Panther, 147 Okla. 131, 295 P. 219; Lyon v. Lyon, 39 0kla. 111,
134 P. 650.
" Jegendorf v. Jegendorf, 61 Wyo. 277, 157 P. 2d 280.
lbVernier Family Lawq, 1932.
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cause-same crime or misconduct (3) ; any cause-cause of equal
wrong (2) ; any cause-adultery (3) ; adultery-any cause (1);
any cause-adultery or like cause (1) ; desertion, cruelty, adultery,
intoxication-like conduct (1).
THE PROS AND CONS OF RECRIMINATION

After this brief look at recrimination and its by-product doctrines the question still remains as to what would be a suitable
solution. Should some of these doctrines such as comparative
rectitude or the same offense doctrine be adopted, or should the
recrimination provision be excluded from our statutes, or shall
we call the existing statute satisfactory for our needs and let it
remain as it is? Needless to say, the state of the divorce laws is
quite controversial and many opinions exist as to their ultimate
fate.
Those advocating that recrimination doctrines and applications should be strictly construed and adhered to use an argument
which is fairly well summed up by the Colorado court in a 1905
case 11'which states as follows:
The complainant must come with clean hands and a
chaste character not stained with the infamy and crime
of which she complains. 1he parties are in pari delicto,
and to grant relief to either of them would be offering a
bounty to guilt. It would place the permanency of the
marriage contract, in every case, at the disposal of the
contracting parties, and remove one of the strongest motives to that correctness and chastity of conduct which is
necessary to render the marriage state either pleasant
or convenient.
This is a fairly accurate statement of the general argument set
forth by those beating the drum for recrimination. In other words,
what they are saying is that the law deems the party seeking a
divorce to be innocent. If under the statute the parties to the
marriage-and sadly enough to the divorce-are in pari delicto,
how can the courts decide which is the innocent and which the
injured party? And going a step farther they ask, can either have
the contract vacated at the expense of the other, when it has been
equally infracted by both? Therefore these advocates believe the
rule should be to allow the defendant to recriminate for any of
the causes which would dissolve the contract, whether it be codem
delictum or not.
On the other side of the fence we find those who believe that
something should be done about recrimination, and a good summary of their arguments in support of relaxation of the doctrine
of recrimination appeared in the K. C. Law Reviewo2 0 which states,
I"Elliott v. Elliott, 34 Colo. 298, 83 P. 630 (1905).
20Vol. 10 K. C. Law Review 249,50.
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Denial of divorce seldom restores life to families
sociologically dead when they came into court, and that
if anything is preserved it is but the dead and empty shell
of what has been and is no longer a realization, that upon
the refusal of divorce, those things which cannot be done
legally are often done illegally, relationships are formed,
nameless children are born, and that even if the parties
forces themselves to remain together, their children will
probably not thank them for it or even be imbued with
any high and lasting ideals about their family, or the
family as a sociological concept. If this is the justification
for permitting divorce where only one party is at fault,
how much more reasonable is it to permit divorce where
both parties hold their marriage vows in contempt, and
the likelihood that attempts at reconcilliation will fail
are thereby doubled. Possibly at one time-when a party
convicted of adultery was prohibited from marrying again
-a distinction could be made. But if so, it is no longer
valid today. With a few limitations, the defendant as
well as the successful petitioner is permitted to remarry
and possibly achieve the happiness he failed to find in
his first marriage.
These arguments are sound, for it seems that the parties to a
divorce action differ from those in the ordinary civil action. In
the divorce action the judge protects the state's interest in an
orderly society, the interest of the citizens, and above all the court
should protect the welfare of the children who might be affected
by divorce proceedings. Therefore a strict application of the clean
hands doctrine is nothing more than a form of punishment dealt
to the erring spouses, and omits consideration of the interests of
those who are no more than innocent bystanders but who are nevertheless dealt misery because they are adversely affected by a decree which leaves both the guilty litigants where the court found
them-and in the situation where they placed themselves. To
compel two persons who both seek divorce to live together seems
to be a moral injustice, for divorce itself is the climax-it is a
word describing shattered domestic harmony and affection which
has been replaced by discord and strong hatred.
Therefore the choice which we are left with is (1) a dissolution of the existing marriage with the possibility of future happiness and respectability through remarriage or (2) continuing the
existing marriage and harboring a pretended legal cohabitation
which in all probability will result in promiscuity by both parties
to satisfy passions and quell emotions. It seems to the writer that
there is only one available choice-that is the first-because this
choice best meets the needs of our present-day society. The problem exists and the question remains what shall we do about it?

